Orphans, Baby Blaines, and the Brave New World of State Funded Education: Why Nevada\u27s New Voucher Program Should Be Upheld Under Both State and Federal Law by Wilhelmsen, David
Journal of Legislation
Volume 42 | Issue 2 Article 6
5-27-2016
Orphans, Baby Blaines, and the Brave New World
of State Funded Education: Why Nevada's New
Voucher Program Should Be Upheld Under Both
State and Federal Law
David Wilhelmsen
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
Part of the Education Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Legislation by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
David Wilhelmsen, Orphans, Baby Blaines, and the Brave New World of State Funded Education: Why Nevada's New Voucher Program





ORPHANS, BABY BLAINES, AND THE BRAVE NEW 
WORLD OF STATE FUNDED EDUCATION: WHY NEVADA’S 
NEW VOUCHER PROGRAM SHOULD BE UPHELD UNDER 




In May 2015, the Nevada Assembly transformed its education system by passing 
Senate Bill 302.1 This new law enabled Nevada students to opt out of public schools 
and receive roughly $5,000 in state funding applicable toward private schooling.2 But 
before the ink dried, two separate lawsuits emerged challenging its constitutionality. 
First, the ACLU alleged it violated the Nevada constitution’s prohibition on funding 
“sectarian purpose[s]” 3 by permitting private religious schools to receive funds.4 It 
also claimed ESAs ran afoul of Nevada’s duty to provide “a uniform system of public 
schools”5 by funding a competing alternative.6 Aside from the ACLU’s lawsuit, 
Educate Nevada Now (hereafter ENN) filed a separate action alleging that two 
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         1.  NEV. DEP’T. OF EDUCATION, http://www.doe.nv.gov/Legislative/Education_Savings_Accounts/ (last 
visited 01/15/2016) [hereinafter Education Savings Account (SB 302)]. 
 2.  Emma Brown, Nevada’s New School Voucher Program Faces Second Legal Challenge, WASH. POST, 
(Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/nevadas-new-school-voucher-program-
faces-second-legal-challenge/2015/09/10/29e4183a-57cf-11e5-8bb1-b488d231bba2_story.html. 
 3.  NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. XI, § 10 (1880). No funding clauses are often called “baby Blaine” 
amendments since they originate in failed language proposed as part of the Federal Constitution by then Speaker 
of the House, James Blaine. See Meir Katz, The State of Blaine: A closer Look at the Blain Amendments and 
Their Modern Application, 12 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 111, 112 (2011). The Blaine 
Amendment and consequent “baby Blaines” modeled after it flowed from anti-Catholic sentiment sweeping the 
nation during the 1970s. Speaker Blaine seized upon this sentiment in the hopes of boosting his chances of 
becoming the next president. While some dispute his personal feelings regarding Catholicism, his proposed 
amendment was a clear attack on the growing influence of the Catholic Church in America. See e.g. Katz, supra 
note 3, at 112. 
 4.  See Emma Brown, ACLU Sues to Stop Nevada’s New School Voucher Program, WASHINGTON POST, 
Aug. 27, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ local/education/aclu-says-its-suing-to-stop-nevadas-new-
school-voucher-program/2015/08/27/db57dcd2-4cd0-11e5-902f-39e9219e574b_story.html; see also Katz, 
supra note 3 (“Today, the term “sectarian,” is widely interpreted (contrary to its historical meaning) as a 
synonym for “religious.” The Blaine Amendments thus operate to impose a per se bar against funding to all 
religious organizations.”). 
 5.  Complaint at 13, Lopez v. Schwartz, filed (Nev. Dist. Ct. Sep. 9, 2015), available at 
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/local/nevada-voucher-complaint/1736/. 
 6.  Id. 
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obscure constitutional provisions barred the Nevada Legislature from using the 
Education Fund on anything besides public schools.7 Because ENN’s procedural 
arguments defy constitutional language, this Note will only briefly outline and refute 
them. The bulk of discussion will be geared toward Nevada’s no funding clause (i.e. 
“baby Blaine” amendment) and its uniformity clause. Thus, this Note will analyze 
(1) Nevada case law, (2) precedent from other states, (3) and Supreme Court 
jurisprudence to argue Nevada’s ESA program must be upheld under both state and 
federal law. The latter is particularly timely in light of the Supreme Court’s fresh 
grant of certiorari to a Missouri case involving whether a state can deny funding to 
an organization purely on the basis of religious viewpoint.8  
Part I of this Note will demonstrate that Nevada law permits upholding its new 
voucher program. Under Nevada’s no funding clause, ESAs pass muster because they 
provide funding to individual families who independently decide how to spend the 
money. 9 The Nevada legislature, therefore, is not responsible if they put the money 
toward religious schooling.10 However, even if a court interpreted the voucher 
program as directly funding religious schools, the matter would not be settled. 
Nevada case law only deems certain religions “sectarian”.11 Consequently, 
construing voucher money to be a direct allocation to schools would force Nevada 
courts decide which religious schools qualified as sectarian, resulting in a judicial 
nightmare.12 Regarding its uniformity clause, the Nevada Supreme Court has 
minimally expounded upon it, stating only that school districts cannot count children 
ineligible to attend public schools toward their funding.13  One interpretation of this 
is that only children attending public schools should receive public education money. 
However, a better reading is that since ESA recipients are entitled to attend public 
schools, they are thereby eligible to receive state education money. Lastly, the 
Nevada Supreme Court has instructed courts to interpret laws using original public 
meaning with a thumb on the scale favoring constitutionality.14 ESAs, then, should 
 
 7.  Nevada School Choice, IJ.org, http://ij.org/case/nevada-school-choice/ (last visited 01/16/2016). 
 8.  See Eugene Volokh, The Supreme Court Will Consider: When Does Government Discrimination 
Against Churches Violate the First Amendment?, WASHINGTON POST, (Jan. 15, 2015), 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/01/15/the-supreme-court-will-consider-when-
does-government-discrimination-against-churches-violate-the-first-amendment/. 
 9.  See Brown, supra note 2. 
 10.  It is hardly different than a state government holding itself responsible for an employee using part of 
his pay to support a religious organization. 
 11.  See State v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373, 385-86 (Nev. 1882). 
 12.  Interpreting Nevada’s ESA program as direct aid to religious schools would force the courts to 
distinguish between sectarian and non-sectarian schools by analogizing them to either general Protestantism or 
Catholicism. In addition to causing obvious problems, this would likely violate various clauses of the U.S. 
Constitution. See e.g. Katz, supra note 3, at 113 (quoting Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-29 (2000) (“It 
is no surprise that the Supreme Court in 2000 condemned the doctrine of sectarianism embodied by the Blaine 
Amendments in the strongest possible terms: they have a ‘shameful pedigree,’ were ‘born of bigotry,’ and 
‘should be buried now.’”)). Aspects of this issue will be discussed in the federal portion of the paper. 
 13.  See State v. Westerfield, 49 P. 119, 121 (Nev. 1897) (court said orphans educated in their orphan 
asylum could not be used by a local school district to increase its own funding since doing so would result in a 
windfall for the district). 
 14.  See Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. Draney, 530 P.2d 108, 112 (Nev. 1974) “Every reasonable 
presumption must be indulged in support of the controverted statute. . .”; see also Thomas v. Nevada Yellow 
Cab Corp., 327 P.3d 518, 522 (Nev. 2014) (court said to interpret documents according to their “original public 
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be presumed constitutional and read to allow funding for many religious schools 
since only Catholics, Presbyterians, and other such denominations were viewed as 
“sectarian” when both clauses were enacted. 
Part II of this Note will illustrate how neighboring states have construed similar 
constitutional provisions to permit voucher programs like the one at issue. While the 
Washington Supreme Court held that a scholarship recipient could not pursue a 
degree in religious studies because of the state’s no funding clause, the facts of that 
case differ from Nevada’s ESA program.15 Meanwhile, other states have approved 
voucher programs like Nevada’s under their own no funding clauses because the 
legislature allocates voucher money to individual families, not religious schools. 16 
Concerning uniformity clauses, states with language mirroring Nevada’s have 
interpreted them as a floor, not a ceiling. They have concluded that this permits the 
legislature to fund vouchers so long as public schools remain a baseline option. 17  
Precedent from states with similar facts and constitutional language, then, suggests 
Nevada courts should uphold its ESA program.  
 Finally, Part III of this Note will argue that under the U.S. Constitution, Nevada 
must reject the challenges to its ESA program. This year, the Court will render a long 
awaited decision on whether states can bar schools from generally available aid 
programs purely on the basis of their religion.18 Trinity Lutheran Church of 
Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley19 centers on whether Missouri can refuse to supply a 
Christian school with rubber to resurface its playground solely because it is 
religiously affiliated.20 The Supreme Court has never formally ruled on the 
Constitutional validity of “baby Blaine” amendments. However, it has said laws 
crafted to prejudice religion either directly or indirectly violate the Free Exercise 
Clause.21 While it has allowed narrow carve-outs for extreme cases like training for 
the clergy22, it has advocated a principle of neutrality when funding religious and 
non-religious recipients alike.23 It has also said states cannot discriminate against 
groups due to their religious viewpoint.24 This applies even to voluntary state 
 
understanding. . .not some abstract purpose underlying them.”). 
 15.  See Witters v. State Comm’n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1120 (Wash. 1989). 
 16.  See Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1229 (Ind. 2013); see also Niehaus v. Huppenthal, 310 P.3d 
983, 987 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). 
 17.  See e.g., Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1222. 
 18.  See Volokh, supra note 8. 
 19.  2016 WL 205949 (2016), cert. granted. 
 20.  Volokj, supra note 8 (“A Missouri program gives grants to organizations that want to resurface 
playgrounds with this material, which is often made from recycled tires. . .Trinity Lutheran Church’s 
application was, according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit, ‘ranked fifth out of forty four 
applications in 2012, and. . .fourteen projects were funded.’ But Trinity’s application was rejected [on account 
of Missouri’s ‘baby Blaine’ amendment.”). 
 21.  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (law targeting 
religious beliefs as such are never permissible). 
 22.  See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 (2004) (Court said “training for religious professions and 
training for secular professions are not fungible” and therefore the state could refuse to fund training for the 
former). 
 23.  See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. Of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). 
 24.  See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (the state cannot 
discriminate based on religious viewpoint). 
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funding.25 Lastly, the Court has said prohibiting certain groups from seeking 
generally available legal benefits violates Equal Protection.26 Thus, in anticipation of 
the Court’s upcoming decision in Trinity Lutheran, this Note will explain why federal 
law prohibits Nevada from excluding religious schools.  
 In sum, Nevada law, precedent from other states with similar constitutional 
provisions, and U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence suggest Nevada courts must 
uphold its ESA program.  
I. WHY THE NEVADA CONSTITUTION PERMITS EDUCATION SAVINGS ACCOUNTS 
A. Snap Shot of Nevada Law as it Relates to Education and Government 
Funding for Religious Groups 
The first half of this Part will conduct a brief overview of Nevada decisions 
interpreting its own “baby Blaine” and uniformity clauses.27 It will then apply those 
decisions to Nevada’s ESA program. Parts II and III will follow in similar fashion. 
Concerning Nevada’s “baby Blaine” amendment, the only case on point is State v. 
Hallock.28 There, the Nevada Supreme Court deemed a Catholic orphan asylum 
“sectarian” and thereby ineligible to receive public funding.29 The Nevada Attorney 
General consequently issued several opinions prohibiting the state from promoting 
religious purposes, but permitting it to fund religious groups so long as it acted 
neutrally.30 Regarding Nevada’s uniformity clause, case law is even more limited. In 
State v. Dovey, the Nevada Supreme Court held that children enrolled in a state 
orphan asylum could not count toward district funding because they were legally 
barred from attending them.31 It consequently held in State v. Westerfield that the 
salary for the asylum’s teacher had to come from the General Fund rather than the 
School Fund.32 Finally, the Nevada Supreme Court has said to interpret laws 
according to original public meaning and in favor of constitutionality.33 This section, 
then, will explain Nevada law relating to its no funding and uniformity clauses.  
In 1866, the Nevada Assembly began appropriating money to an orphan asylum 
run by Catholic nuns.34 Anti-Catholic sentiment made this controversial from the 
very beginning.35 For example, a house legislative committee said supporting the 
 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). 
 27.  Unfortunately, there appears to be no Nevada case law relevant to ENN’s two procedural objections. 
Consequently, a close examination of the constitutional language at issue must suffice to invalidate them. 
 28.  See Hallock, 16 Nev. at 385-86. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Jay S. Bybee & David W. Newton, Of Orphans and Vouchers: Nevada’s “Little Blaine Amendment” 
and the Future of Religious Participation in Public Programs, 1 NEV. L.J. 551, 573 (2002) (citing various 
opinions written over the years by the Nevada Attorney General). 
 31.  State v. Dovey, 12 P. 910, 912 (Nev. 1887). 
 32.  State v. Westerfield, 49 P. 119, 121 (Nev. 1897). 
 33.  See Hallock, 16 Nev. at 385-86. 
 34.  Bybee, supra note 23, at 564. 
 35.  See e.g. Id. at 563; see also Brief of Amici Curiae for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, the 
Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, and Historians and Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondent, at 11, Locke v. Davey, No. 02-1315 (Sep. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Brief] (“This was not a fringe 
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asylum allowed it “to train up the children in the tenets” of the Catholicism.36 
Consequently, in 1970 the Nevada Assembly opened a state-operated orphan asylum 
to compete with its Catholic counterpart, hoping “it might be forced to close.”37 By 
1976, James Blaine, then Speaker of the House, introduced an amendment to the 
Federal Constitution prohibiting “any school funds, or school taxes…for the benefit 
of or in aid…of any religious sect or denomination.”38 Most scholars agree it was “a 
thinly veiled attack on Catholic schools.”39 Blaine’s Amendment ultimately failed to 
become part of the Federal Constitution. Nonetheless, Nevada became one of the first 
states to take up his torch.  In 1877, a Nevada assemblyman proposed amending the 
Nevada Constitution to read: “No public funds, of any kind or character whatever, 
State, county, or municipal, shall be used for sectarian purposes.”40 It was ratified 
soon thereafter. Although some saw no conflict between the new amendment and 
allocating state money to the Catholic asylum, the others, including the Governor, 
believed it signaled a long-awaited end to state funding for Catholic organizations.41 
Consequently, when another bill was passed to fund the asylum, the State 
Comptroller refused to sign over the money to the Catholic asylum, insisting it 
violated the Nevada constitution. 42 This withholding gave rise to Hallock.43  
The Hallock court held that the Catholic asylum was indeed sectarian and 
therefore ineligible to receive state funding.44 While the court conceded that it was 
“not plain, from the amendment itself, what the people meant by the words ‘sectarian 
purposes’”,45 it said the Catholic asylum qualified because it had “…greatly, if not 
entirely, impelled the adoption of the constitutional amendment [at issue.]”46 In other 
words, the court reasoned that the authors of Nevada’s “baby Blaine” must have 
meant for it to encompass the Catholic asylum since it sparked the amendment.47 
 
movement. In Massachusetts, the Know-Nothing party swept the elections of 1854, gaining the governorship, 
the entire congressional delegation, all forty seats in the Senate, and all but 3 of the 379 members of the House 
of Representatives.”). 
 36.  Bybee, supra note 30, at 563. 
 37.  Id. at 565. 
 38.  Katz, supra note 3 (emphasis added). 
 39.  Id.; see also Mitchell 530 U.S. 828-29 (2000) (plurality opinion) (Four Justices, led by Justice Thomas, 
discussed the nativism and anti-Catholic sentiment that sparked both the failed federal Blaine Amendment and 
consequent state “baby Blaines.”). 
 40.  Bybee, supra note 30, at 565. 
 41.  Id. at 556-57; see also Bybee, supra note 30, at 584 (Explaining that many of the original proponents 
of Nevada’s “baby Blaine” amendment saw it as “a silver bullet, a constitutional fix” intended to prohibit 
funding to the Catholic asylum once and for all). 
 42.  Id. at 567. 
 43.  Hallock was the case resulting from the Catholic asylum’s decision to sue the State Controller to 
recover the funds he refused to sign over to it. See Bybee, supra note 23, at 568 (“When Hallock refused to 
release the Asylum’s funds authorized by the legislature, the Asylum filed an original action in the Nevada 
Supreme Court, seeking a writ of mandamus against the state controller to compel payments of $1,279.79.”). 
 44.  See Hallock, 16 Nev. at 387. 
 45.  Id. at 380. 
 46.  Id. at 383; see also Brief, supra note 35 (indicating that the Nevada amendment was typical of “State 
Blaine Amendments [which were] frequently used to strike down” Catholic programs). 
 47.  This conclusion was likely due less to historical research than it was to the well-known motives behind 
the Blaine Amendment and its state counterparts at the time. For example, President Grant called for an end to 
“sectarian” funding around that time in a speech where he accused the Catholic Church as perpetuating 
“superstition, ambition and ignorance.” See Brief, supra note 35. 
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Although this accomplished the bulk of the logical heavy lifting, the court proceeded 
to define sectarian to mean “a distinct organization or party, holding sentiments or 
doctrines different from those of other sects or people.”48 Curiously, however, it said 
teachings “common to all Christians” did not fall within this category.49 Nevada’s 
“baby Blaine” amendment, then, permitted state funding for general Protestant 
teachings, but proscribed their Catholic equivalent.50 Moreover, the ideological 
alignment of a group made its activities irrelevant; the Catholic asylum, then, was 
denied funding even for the purely corporeal needs of the orphans.51 The court 
justified this by reasoning that it could not “separate the legitimate use from that 
which is forbidden.”52 Thus, under Hallock, Catholics and other yet-to-be-defined 
sectarian groups were denied funding, while Protestant groups faced no such 
banishment. 
Since Hallock, the Nevada Attorney General has issued multiple opinions 
interpreting Nevada’s no funding provision. These have no binding effect. However, 
they generally permit funding religious groups for non-religious purposes. In 1963, 
the Attorney General interpreted Nevada’s no funding clause to “prevent[] sectarian 
religious instruction in the public schools,”53 reasoning that young children should 
not be subjected to religious indoctrination by the state. He later used that logic to 
opine that a state prison could hire a pastor because inmates were less impressionable 
than young children.54 In 1970, the new Nevada AG said religious schools could 
receive free access to state educational broadcasts because they neither imposed an 
added cost on the state nor flowed from bias toward a certain religion.55 Nevada’s no 
funding clause, then, permitted the state to aid religion so long as it did so in a general 
and neutral manner. Finally, in 1993, yet another Nevada AG said religious groups 
could use public school property for religious purposes so long as no public funds 
were “expended for the sectarian purpose.”56 This contradicted Hallock’s reasoning 
that the legitimate could not be separated from the forbidden.57 In essence, the 
opinion seemed to indicate Nevada could cooperate with religion so long as it did not 
actively promote it. Thus, the Nevada Attorney General’s office has generally said 
state aid to religious groups for non-sectarian purposes is constitutional, but funding 
flowing from religious biases or aimed at promoting religion in schools is 
 
 48.  Hallock, 16 Nev. at 385. 
 49.  See Katz, supra note 3, at 112 (Noting that  “public schools in the nineteenth century were largely 
Protestant institutions. They often required daily Bible reading, typically without commentary from a teacher 
or other school personnel.” Consequently, it is hardly surprising that the court would draw this distinction.); see 
also e.g. Billard v. Board of Educ., 76 P. 422, 423 (Kan. 1904) (holding that reading the Lord’s prayer and the 
Twenty-Third Psalm did not equate to sectarianism, but rather instilled basic morals essential to education). 
 50.  Hallcok, 16 Nev. at 386. 
 51.  See id., (contending that “baby Blaine” amendments “disqualify all religious groups from receiving 
any government funds, regardless of their purpose”). 
 52.  Id. at 388. 
 53.  Bybee, supra note 30, at 573. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Bybee, supra note 30, at 571. 
 57.  See Hallcok, 16 Nev. at 388. 
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forbidden.58 
Interestingly, the two Nevada cases addressing Nevada’s uniform schools clause 
involve the same state asylum created to compete with the Catholic orphanage. In 
State v. Dovey, the court said orphans living within a school district could not be 
counted for funding purposes because they were legally barred from enrolling in 
public schools.59 State law provided that the orphans had to be educated within the 
home by a resident teacher.60 Consequently, the court reasoned that using them to 
augment district funding was unfair since they were effectively foreign to it. Building 
on Dovey’s logic, Westerfield said the asylum’s resident teacher could not be paid 
out of the state education fund,61 reasoning that money from the general Education 
Fund could only be used for state expenditures “immediately connected with the 
education system.”62 Because the orphans could not attend public schools, their 
education costs did not fall within that category. The Education Fund, therefore, had 
to be apportioned by district according to the number of children eligible to attend.63  
Finally, the Nevada Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to uphold statutes 
whenever possible and interpret the constitution according to its original public 
meaning. “Every reasonable presumption must be indulged in support of the 
controverted statute…”64 Therefore, doubts about the constitutionality of legislation 
should be decided against the challenging party.65 The court also reiterated (as 
recently as 2014) that documents should be interpreted according to “original public 
understanding…not some abstract purpose underlying them.”66 Judges must 
determine what the text would mean to the average reader at the time it was written. 
Meanwhile, legislative intent should be irrelevant.67 Thus, the Nevada Supreme 
Court supports reading statutes in favor of constitutionality and interpreting them 
according to their original public meaning.  
In sum, the Nevada Supreme Court has said sectarian organizations cannot 
receive public funding; however, it has emphasized that not all religious 
organizations are sectarian. The Attorney General, meanwhile, has said that the state 
legislature can fund religious groups only if (1) the purpose is secular, (2) it imposes 
a marginal cost, (3) or it does not show bias toward a particular sect. Regarding its 
uniform school clause, the Supreme Court has cryptically said the Education Fund 
money cannot be spent on schooling for children ineligible to attend public schools. 
Finally, the Nevada Supreme Court has instructed courts to read statutes in favor of 
constitutionality using original public meaning.  
 
 58.  Bybee, supra note 30, at 574 (“In general, the Attorney General has concluded that Section 10 does 
not bar state subsidies to sectarian institutions, such as hospitals or parochial schools, where the purpose for the 
expenditure can be clearly identified and is not sectarian in nature; the Attorney General has thus made some 
effort to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate purposes.”). 
 59.  See Dovey, 12 P. at 912. 
 60.  Id. at 911. 
 61.  See Westerfield, 49 P. at 120. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 530 P.2d at 112. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Thomas v. Nevada Yellow Cab Corp., 327 P.3d 518, 522 (Nev. 2014). 
 67.  Id. 
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B. Why Education Savings Accounts Are Permissible Under Nevada Law 
This section of Part I will demonstrate that ESA’s are permissible under 
Nevada’s “baby Blaine” amendment, uniform school clause, and the procedural 
provisions flagged by ENN. ESAs transfer state funds to families, not private 
religious schools. Therefore, they bypass any “baby Blaine” concerns. However, 
even if ESA’s were seen as a direct legislative allocation to religious schools, many 
religious schools would remain eligible since Hallock rendered general protestant 
teachings nonsectarian.68 Regarding Nevada’s uniformity clause, ESAs are also 
permissible because it establishes a baseline obligation to provide public schools, not 
a ceiling barring funding for other educational options. Lastly, the two procedural 
arguments raised by ENN are complicated but contrary to logic and constitutional 
language. Thus, ESA’s conform to the Nevada constitution.    
Under Hallock, Nevada’s ESA program does violate its “baby Blaine” 
amendment. Nevada’s new law puts state money into an education savings account 
controlled by the participating child’s parents; they choose when, where, and how to 
spend that money, subject only to mild certification standards set by the state.69 Any 
subsequent transfer to a private religious school, then, results purely from the 
independent choice of individual families. As we will see later, this line of logic has 
been accepted by several states.70 Although the analysis should end there, it is 
important to note that even if ESA money represented a direct allocation to private 
religious schools, this would still be permissible in many instances.71 While the 
ACLU claims all private religious schools are sectarian because they teach religious 
principles or hold religious viewpoints, the word “sectarian” is inherently unclear 
under Nevada law.72 The Hallock court classified the Catholic asylum as sectarian 
primarily because it fueled the amendment in question.73 It also defined “sectarian” 
to mean “a distinct organization or party, holding sentiments or doctrines different 
from those of other sects or people.”74 However, the court emphasized that general 
Protestant teachings were not sectarian.75 The Catholic asylum only qualified as such 
because: “The framers of the constitution undoubtedly considered [it] a sectarian 
church.”76 Therefore, under Hallock, Nevada courts would have to determine 
whether the religious principles taught at each school were sectarian or not.77 The 
 
 68.  Hallcok, 16 Nev. at 386. 
 69.  Education Savings Accounts (SB 302), supra note 1. 
 70.  See e.g., Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1229 (Ind. 2013). 
 71.  But see Bybee, supra note 30, at 584 (concluding that Nevada’s no funding clause must be read either 
as a prohibition on funding specific religious sects at the expense of others, or as referring to religion generally). 
However, this approach seems to ignore the fact that Nevada’s “baby Blaine” amendment was largely a result 
to injure Catholicism while leaving Protestant teachings in place. 
 72.  Brown, supra note 3.  See also Hallock, 16 Nev. at 380. 
 73.  Hallock, 16 Nev. at 380. 
 74.  Id. at 385. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 385-86. 
 77.  But see Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws: State Blain Amendments and Religious Persecution, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 523 (2003) (“The social and religious contexts in which the State Blaines operate today 
are far different from those of their origins and, consequently, faithful applications of the language of the State 
Blaines no longer divides, for purposes of public funding, the Protestant public schools from the Catholic private 
 
2016] Journal of Legislation 265 
Nevada Supreme Court has said to interpret constitutional amendments according to 
“original public understanding…not some abstract purpose underlying them.”78  
Hence, the proper test would be whether any given school fell under the common 
definition of “sectarian” as generally understood in Nevada one hundred and fifty 
years ago.79 This would be a judicial nightmare, likely to yield arbitrary results. 
Therefore, Nevada courts should avoid this pitfall in a principled and practical 
manner by recognizing that ESAs fund individual families, not religious schools.  
The Attorney General’s opinions (though not legally binding on the court) also 
permit ESAs under its “baby Blaine” Amendment. If ESA’s are seen as funding 
families, further discussion is irrelevant. However, even if ESAs were found to 
directly fund religious schools, the Attorney General’s reasoning over the years might 
still permit them. First, the Attorney General approved state-funded broadcasts for 
religious schools because the funding did not flow from bias toward a certain 
religion.80 Within this framework, ESAs allow individual families to choose which 
(if any) religious school they want their children to attend. Such a system makes 
government bias toward a specific religion highly unlikely. Second, the AG said 
religious groups could use public school property for religious purposes so long as 
no public funds were “expended for the sectarian purpose.”81 ESAs do not expend 
money for a sectarian purpose; they provide money to individual families to increase 
educational opportunities. A counterargument would highlight the AG’s traditional 
aversion to funding any religious purposes in public schools;82 however, private 
religious schools fall into a different category. While parents expect neutrality from 
public schools, they usually desire a religious element in private religious schools. 
Thus, ESAs are clearly permissible since they go to families to fund better education, 
not sectarian institutions for the purpose of advancing a certain religion.  
ESAs are also constitutional under Nevada’s uniformity clause. The ACLU 
claims Nevada’s voucher program “violates this clause by providing public funding 
to a non-uniform and competing system of private schools” with different standards 
from public schools.83 However, Nevada’s uniformity clause does not purport to 
prevent funding for other types of education.84 It just establishes a baseline duty. In 
Dovey, the Nevada Supreme Court said orphans did not count toward funding the 
 
schools.”). While this might be true as a general matter, the Nevada Supreme Court has never indicated that it 
plans to abandon the old distinction between sectarian and non-sectarian religions. Moreover, the Nevada 
Supreme Court should not lightly redefine the word sectarian since it has instructed courts to interpret statutes 
according to their original public meaning. See Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. Draney, 530 P.2d 108, 112 (Nev. 
1974); see also Thomas v. Nevada Yellow Cab Corp., 327 P.3d 518, 522 (Nev. 2014). 
 78.  See Thomas, 327 P.3d at 522. 
 79.  See e.g. Bybee, supra note 30, at 585 (Noting the severe confusion that this would cause, the author 
suggests: “The Nevada courts may cure this latent hostility by reading Section 10 to mean that the state cannot 
fund the purposes of a single religious sect, but that Section 10 does not disqualify religious institutions from 
receiving state aid or participating in state programs under a neutral scheme.”). 
 80.  Bybee, supra note 30, at 573. 
 81.  Id. at 571. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Complaint at 19, Duncan v. Nevada, (Nev. Dist. Ct., filed Aug. 27, 2015), available at 
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/local/aclu-lawsuit-challenging-nevada-school-voucher-
program/1710/. 
 84.  See NEV. CONST. art. 11 § 2. 
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school district in which they lived because they were not entitled to attend those 
public schools.85 The orphans in question were unique since state law compelled the 
asylum to educate them separately within its walls. By contrast, children eligible to 
receive ESAs can attend Nevada’s public schools if they so choose (that choice is the 
very essence of the ESA program).86 One could argue that ESA recipients are 
ineligible to attend public school once they elect ESAs, just as the orphans were 
ineligible to attend public school so long as they remained within the asylum. 
However, Dovey centered on the reasoning that school districts should not receive a 
windfall for children they did not educate.87 ESAs, meanwhile, do not unfairly 
augment public school districts; in fact, funding flows directly to the school each 
child attends.88 Finally, Westerfield said the teacher in the orphan home could not be 
paid out of the education fund because “the constitution does not include the 
education of these children in the term ‘educational purposes.’”89 This could be used 
to argue that only public school children are included within the term “educational 
purposes” and therefore ineligible for funding. However, a better reading is that 
funding can flow to any child entitled to attend public school. ESA recipients, then, 
are included within the term “educational purposes” because they can choose to 
attend public schools. Thus, funding ESAs is constitutional under Nevada’s uniform 
school clause.  
In the second lawsuit, Educate Nevada Now makes two additional procedural 
claims that are complicated but constitutionally weak. There is no Nevada case law 
interpreting either provision, but logic serves to dissuade both. First, ENN says ESAs 
violate the Nevada Legislature’s duty to allocate the amount of funding “[it] deems 
sufficient, when combined with the local money reasonably available for this 
purpose, to fund the operation of the public schools”90 By channeling some of that 
money to ESAs, ENN argues, the Legislature reduces its appropriation “below the 
level [it previously] deemed sufficient.”91 ENN, in other words, concedes that the 
Legislature is entrusted to determine what is sufficient to fund public schools, but 
then accuses them of making it insufficient by reducing it according to the number 
of students who elect ESAs instead of attending those public schools. It is silly to 
conclude that the legislature invalidates the sufficiency of its own allocation by 
directing part of it to the ESA program, especially since the Nevada constitution 
specifies no concrete process that must be followed in making this allocation.92 
Second, ENN claims Nevada’s ESA program violates the Legislature’s duty to use 
funds derived from “[a]ll lands granted [to the state] for educational purposes…for 
educational purposes.”93 It claims the phrase “educational purposes” really 
 
 85.  Dovey, 12 P. at 912. 
 86.  See Education Savings Accounts (SB 302), supra note 1. 
 87.  Dovey, 12 P. at 911. 
 88.  See Education Savings Accounts (SB 302), supra note 1. 
 89.  State v. Westfield, 49 P. 119, 121 (Nev. 1897). 
 90.  See NEV. CONST. art. 11 § 6.2. 
 91.  Complaint at 13, Lopez v. Schwartz, filed (Nev. Dist. Ct. Sep. 9, 2015), available at 
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/local/nevada-voucher-complaint/1736/. 
 92.  See NEV. CONST. art. 11 § 2. 
 93.  Complaint, supra note 91, at 13 (emphasis added). 
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corresponds to “public schools.”94 However, the provision in question never 
mentions “public schools”, or even alludes to the concept of public education. It 
simply says proceeds “are hereby pledged for educational purposes.”95 ESAs qualify 
as such.96 Thus, the two procedural claims raised by ENN attempt to confuse the court 
by twisting constitutional language.  
ESAs, therefore, are constitutional under Nevada’s baby Blaine amendment, 
uniform school clause, and additional procedural sections.  
II. PRECEDENT FROM SIMILARLY SITUATED STATES SUPPORTS UPHOLDING 
NEVADA’S ESA PROGRAM 
A. An Overview of How Neighboring States Have Treated Voucher Programs 
and Religious Schooling under Similar Constitutional Clauses 
States have come to diverging conclusions regarding funding for religious 
schooling under their own no funding and uniformity clauses. In terms of the former, 
one approach has been to say no funding clauses prohibit state money from being 
appropriated or applied to religious instruction.97 Washington adopted this logic to 
bar a student from earning a devotional degree with his state scholarship.98 However, 
other states have said voucher programs are permissible because they allocate money 
to independent families.99 Their private choice thereby severs the legal link between 
the state funding and any religious school that ultimately receives it.100 Alternatively, 
other states have said state money can go to religious schools so long as its primary 
effect is not to advance religion;101 voucher programs are therefore permissible 
because their primary effect is to advance education. In terms of uniformity clauses, 
Florida concluded that the duty to promote uniform public schools included a 
converse duty not to fund any competing system of education.102 Other states, 
however, have reasoned that uniformity clauses merely impose a minimum duty to 
offer public schooling and permit funding alternative options such as vouchers.103 
Thus, states have interpreted similar no provisions to reach very different results.   
In Witters v. State Commission for the Blind, the Washington Supreme Court 
said a college student could not use his state scholarship to pursue a degree in pastoral 
 
 94.  Id. at 15. 
 95.  See NEV. CONST. art. 11 § 3 (emphasis added). 
 96.  See e.g., Education Savings Accounts (SB 302), supra note 1. 
 97.  Witters v. State Comm’n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1120 (Wash. 1989). 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  But see Isabel Chou,”Opportunity” For All?: How Tax Credit Scholarships Will fare in New Jersey, 
64 RUTGERS L. REV. 295, 316 (2011) (The author argues that school vouchers are more troubling under no 
funding clauses than tax credits, stating: “In states that operate under moderately- to most-restrictive compelled 
support provisions or “baby Blaine” amendments, the fact that taxpayer dollars will end up in parochial schools 
may very well be grounds for a court to find a constitutional violation.”). 
 100.  Witters, 771 P.2d at 1128-29 (Utter, J., dissenting). 
 101.  See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 621 (Wis. 1998). 
 102.  Bush v. Holmes, 919 So.2d 392, 408-09 (Fla. 2006). 
 103.  See Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 474 (Wis. 1992) (“The uniformity clause clearly was intended 
to assure certain minimal educational opportunities for the children of Wisconsin. It does not require the 
legislature to ensure that all of the children in Wisconsin receive a free uniform basic education.”). 
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studies in order to prepare for a career in the clergy.104 Washington’s “baby Blaine” 
amendment read: “No public money…shall be appropriated for or applied to any 
religious…instruction.” 105 The Plaintiff, Witters, argued that while Washington’s no 
funding clause might apply to a state scholarship program as a whole,106 it did not 
bar his personal decision to pursue a devotional degree.107 The court, however, 
rejected this view. It interpreted Washington’s no funding clause to prohibit “not only 
the appropriation of public money for religious instruction, but also the application 
of public funds to religious instruction.”108 Consequently, Witters could not choose 
to pursue “a career promoting Christianity” using state funds, even though the state 
had no influence on that decision. 109 One interpretation of this holding would be that 
any allocation of state funds to a religious purpose violates Washington’s no funding 
clause; however, an alternative reading is that that this outcome flowed from the 
extreme nature of the case. In either event, however, the court concluded that state 
funds could not be applied toward a degree in devotional theology.110  
By contrast, in Niehaus, the Arizona Supreme Court left intact a court of appeals 
decision permitting the independent application of state money toward a religious 
education. The court acknowledged that Arizona’s no funding provision was 
“virtually identical” to that of Washington.111 However, it said attending a religious 
school was not analogous to training for the clergy: “The ESA students are pursuing 
a basic secondary education with state standards; they are not pursuing a course of 
religious study.”112 In other words, a K-12 education at a religious private school did 
not rise to the level of earning a devotional degree. The court then said that indirect 
application of state voucher money to a private religious school was permissible.113 
ESAs steered clear of funding religious purposes since they simply transferred money 
to individual families for educational purposes. Any consequent benefit to private 
religious schools resulted from “the genuine and independent private choices of the 
parents”, thereby relieving the state of responsibility.114 Unlike Washington, then, 
 
 104.  Witters, 771 P.2d at 1119. 
 105.  WASH. CONST, art. 1, § 11. 
 106.  Thereby prohibiting, say a state scholarship program crafted to promote an education only in pastoral 
ministries. 
 107.  Witters, 771 P.2d at 1122. 
 108.  Id.  See also Duncan, supra note 77, at 569 (“Notice a further complicating factor in Witters’ situation. 
The Washington Supreme Court suggested that its Blaine Amendment targeted only ‘devotional’ religious 
purposes. That is, if Witters had wanted to use the funds to become a purely secular expert in comparative 
religion, the State Blaine would not have barred his use of the funds.”). 
 109.  Witters, 771 P.2d at 1122. 
 110.  But see Richard G. Bacon, Rum, Romanism and Romer: Equal Protection and the Blaine Amendment 
in State Constitutions, 6 DEL. L. REV. 1, 15 (2003) (“The Washington court’s holding simply begs the question 
whether Washington’s classification might survive analysis under the Equal Protection Clause and does not 
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 111.  Niehaus, 310 P.3d at 986. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. at 987 (defining an appropriation as a direct legislative allotment to a particular cause, the court 
reasoned that the indirect application of state money to a religious education was distinct and therefore 
permissible under Arizona’s no funding clause). 
 114.  Id.; see also Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1227 (Ind. 2013), (The Indiana Supreme Court said 
the proper test “is not whether a religious or theological institution substantially benefits from the expenditure, 
but whether the expenditure directly benefits such an institution.” Consequently, school vouchers were 
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Arizona said state money could be applied toward religious purposes so long as it 
resulted from true private choice.115 An unclear dimension of the decision, however, 
was whether that logic would apply to Witters. While one might argue independent 
choice permits families to apply state money toward any religious purpose, it is worth 
remembering that the court took the time to distinguish Witters. Thus, the potency of 
the religious purpose seemed to play a strong role in its decision.116 The Arizona 
court, therefore, opined that ESAs were permissible because the independent choice 
of parents stripped the state of liability for money applied to a private religious 
education, but it took the time to distinguish attending a private religious school from 
training to become pastor. 
In Jackson v. Benson, the Wisconsin Supreme Court said a voucher program 
aimed to assist low-income children access private schools did not violate its no 
funding clause. Wisconsin’s religion clause read: “[N]or shall any money be drawn 
from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological 
seminaries.”117 Hence, while the Washington constitution banned only legislative 
appropriations to religious groups, the Wisconsin constitution prohibiting state 
money from being used to benefit religious groups. One could construe this as a bar 
on school vouchers since they undoubtedly benefit religious schools. The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, however, said the proper test was “not whether some benefit accrues 
to a religious institution as a consequence of the legislative program, but whether its 
principal or primary effect advances religion.”118 The legislature, therefore, could 
allocate tax money to religious schools so long as its main purpose was not to advance 
religion. Its voucher program consequently passed muster because it was not crafted 
to advance religion, but to promote better education.119  
Transitioning to uniformity clauses, in Holmes, the Florida Supreme Court 
interpreted its own version to forbid the legislature from funding any alternative to 
public schools.120 It’s uniformity clause made it “a paramount duty of the state” to 
provide “a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public 
schools.”121 While it said nothing about private schools or vouchers, the Florida 
Supreme Court reasoned that the “paramount duty” to provide uniform, high quality, 
and free public schools imposed a converse duty not to fund competing 
 
permitted since they flowed from the indirect choices of individual families.). 
 114.  Niehaus, 310 P.3d at 987. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Compare id. at 986 (“The ESA does not bear any similarity to the circumstances in Witters. The 
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 118.  Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 621 (Wis. 1998) (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 
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 119.  Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 621. 
 120.  Bush v. Holmes, 919 So.2d 392, 398 (Fla. 2006). 
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alternatives.122 The voucher program at issue allowed students to leave failing public 
schools and put state money toward the private school of their choice. Consequently, 
the court reasoned: “OSP by its very nature undermines the system of ‘high quality’ 
free public schools that are the sole authorized means of fulfilling the constitutional 
mandate to provide for the education of all children residing in Florida.”123 Thus, the 
Florida Supreme Court held that the duty to provide uniform public schools barred 
funding any competing, non-uniform system of education.  
By contrast, in Meredith, the Indiana Supreme Court said its uniformity clause 
was merely a floor, permitting alternative educational options.124 Indiana’s recently 
enacted “Choice Scholarship Program” offered vouchers for low-income families to 
send their children to private schools.125 Adopting Holmes’ line of logic, opponents 
claimed this violated the constitutional mandate “to encourage, by all suitable means, 
moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement; and to provide, by law, 
for a general and uniform system of Common Schools.”126 Indiana’s uniformity 
clause, however, did not include the “paramount duty” language.127 The Indiana 
Supreme Court seized on this to differentiate itself from Florida, reasoning that the 
duty to encourage intellectual improvement was separate and distinct from the duty 
to provide a uniform system of public schools.128 Consequently, so long as the 
legislature maintained public schools as a baseline option, it had “fulfilled [its] 
duty.”129 This permitted it to fund an alternative voucher program. Thus, the Indiana 
Supreme Court used the absence of a paramount duty clause to reason that the 
obligation to provide uniform public schools was merely a floor.   
Likewise, in Davis, the Wisconsin Supreme Court said state scholarships 
intended to help low-income children attend private schools did not violate its 
uniformity clause.130 Opponents alleged that the scholarship program defied the 
legislature’s duty to “provide by law for the establishment of district schools, which 
shall be as nearly uniform as practicable”131 by promoting a system of non-uniform 
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 126.  IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 127.  See id. 
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 129.  Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1223. 
 130.  Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 464 (Wis. 1992) 
 131.  See WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3. 
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schools that afforded a totally different “character of instruction.”132 Like Florida, 
they argued the duty to support uniform public schools imposed an embargo on 
funding any alternative to it.133 However, the Wisconsin constitution contained no 
paramount duty clause modifying its obligation to provide uniform public schools.134 
Therefore, like Indiana, the Wisconsin Supreme Court said it merely mandated a 
baseline educational option; so long as it fulfilled this duty, the Legislature could 
support other educational options.135 The court reasoned: “[E]xperimental attempts 
to improve upon that foundation in no way denies any student the opportunity to 
receive the basic education in the public school system.”136 Thus, so long as 
Wisconsin provided a baseline opportunity to attend uniform public schools, it could 
fund an alternative voucher program.  
In sum, state courts have interpreted similar constitutional clauses differently. 
Some have said no funding clauses forbid the application of state money for religious 
training; others have permitted vouchers due to the independent choice of families or 
the incidental, instead of primary, benefit to religion. Likewise, concerning 
uniformity clauses, while some states have interpreted them as forcing the legislature 
to fund only public schools, others have deemed them a baseline. However, the 
presence or absence of a paramount duty clause has been a factor in their reasoning. 
Thus, while “baby Blaine” clauses have been interpreted sporadically, the reading of 
uniformity clauses by courts has rested partly on the language modifying them.   
B. Case Law from States with Similar Constitutional Provisions Suggests 
Nevada Should Uphold its ESA Program 
Nevada should emulate the decisions of states with similar facts and 
constitutional clauses by upholding its ESA program.137 Unlike Witters, Nevada’s 
ESA program does not involve training for the priesthood.138 Instead, it is analogous 
to the voucher programs reviewed by states like Indiana and Arizona.139 Regarding 
its uniformity clause, Nevada has nothing resembling the “paramount duty” clause 
used to prohibit vouchers by the Florida Supreme Court in Holmes.140 This likens it 
to Indiana and Wisconsin;141 therefore, it should adopt their reasoning and interpret 
its uniformity clause as a floor not a ceiling.142 Nevada should follow in the footsteps 
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of states with similar voucher programs and constitutional provisions by upholding 
its ESA program.   
The K-12 education provided by Nevada’s ESA program is distinguishable from 
Witters. There, the Washington Supreme Court said it violated the state constitution 
to provide scholarship money to a man pursuing “a career promoting Christianity.”143 
This prohibited both direct appropriations by the state legislature and indirect 
applications by individuals like Witters.144 However, the court centered its decision 
on the unique facts of the case, noting: “[T]he applicant is asking the State to pay for 
a religious course of study at a religious school, with a religious career as his goal.”145 
Nevada’s ESA program, by contrast, helps families afford to educate their children 
at the K-12 schools.146 While some religious training might take place, Nevada law 
requires all eligible schools to provide an education in English, Mathematics, and 
other core areas.147 Unlike Witters, the focus is not religious instruction, let alone a 
career in the clergy. Arizona used precisely this point to uphold its own voucher 
program, reasoning: “The ESA students are pursuing a basic secondary 
education…not pursuing a course of religious study.”148 The same holds true for 
Nevada. Consequently, it should reject Witters.  
Instead, Nevada should emulate states with similar “no funding” provisions. In 
Niehaus, the Arizona court upheld an ESA program permitting disabled students to 
attend private religious schools.149 It reasoned that “the genuine and independent 
private choices of the parents” relieved the state of any responsibility for supporting 
religious instruction.150 Likewise, Nevada’s ESA program gives money to individual 
families who decide where to spend the money.151 This independent choice cleanses 
the state of responsibility for any benefits to schools receiving the money 
thereafter.152 As an alternative to Arizona’s private choice approach, Nevada could 
also uphold its ESA program under the reasoning of Wisconsin. The Jackson court 
said the proper test was “not whether some benefit accrues to a religious institution 
as a consequence of the legislative program, but whether its principal or primary 
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effect advances religion.”153 In other words, even direct legislative allocations to 
religious schools were permissible if they were not crafted to promote religion. This 
would permit Nevada’s ESA program since it was created to improve the educational 
options of families.154 Any benefit to religion is indirect and uncertain. Thus, like 
Arizona and Wisconsin, Nevada should approve its voucher program.  
Regarding its uniformity clause, Nevada should follow in the footsteps of states 
with similarly worded provisions. The Florida constitution makes it “a paramount 
duty of the state” to educate Florida children by providing “a uniform, efficient, safe, 
secure, and high quality system of free public schools.”155 Consequently, it implies a 
parallel prohibition on funding a competing system of education (i.e. vouchers).156 
The Nevada constitution, by contrast, contains no “paramount duty” clause, thereby 
voiding Florida’s reasoning. Instead, its uniformity clause mirrors those of states that 
have permitted voucher programs. Indiana said the duty to offer uniform public 
schools was distinct from the duty to encourage education generally.157 So long as a 
free, uniform public school system was maintained, “the General Assembly ha[d] 
fulfilled [its] duty.”158 Likewise, the Wisconsin Supreme Court said its uniformity 
clause ensured a minimal baseline that permitted “experimental attempts to improve 
upon that foundation...”159 Thus, because Nevada’s uniformity clause contains no 
paramount duty language, it should distinguish itself from Florida and apply the 
reasoning of states with similarly worded provisions to uphold its ESA program.   
Nevada should permit its ESA program under both its no funding and uniformity 
clauses. Regarding the former, a K-12 education is far milder than earning a 
devotional degree to pursue a career in the clergy. Thus, Nevada’s ESA program is 
distinguishable from Witters. Meanwhile, it is almost identical to the voucher 
programs upheld by states like Indiana and Arizona. Under the latter, the Florida 
Supreme Court used its paramount duty language to imply a converse prohibition on 
funding competing alternatives. But the Nevada constitution contains no such 
language. Consequently, it is analogous (once again) to Indiana and Wisconsin, both 
of which interpreted their uniformity clauses as a floor, permitting the legislature to 
fund alternative educational options like voucher programs.  Thus, the facts and 
constitutional language surrounding Nevada’s ESA program are analogous to states 
that have upheld similar voucher programs. Consequently, it should adopt their 
reasoning.  
III. BARRING RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS FROM PARTICIPATING IN NEVADA’S ESA 
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PROGRAM WOULD VIOLATE THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
A. An Overview of Federal Constitutional Law Regarding State Voucher 
Programs and Religious Schools 
While the Supreme Court has said voucher programs are permissible under the 
Federal Constitution,160 it has not definitively decided whether states can exclude 
religious schools.161 Fortunately, it granted certiorari to Trinity Lutheran this year 
and will finally say whether states can exclude groups from generally available 
benefits on the basis of religion.162 But since that ruling has yet to arrive, this section 
will explorer Supreme Court jurisprudence relevant to state voucher programs in an 
attempt to predict how Nevada courts should proceed. This section will demonstrate 
that, under the Establishment Clause, the Court has said states must employ neutrality 
in dealing with religious and non-religious groups alike.163 Likewise, it has said the 
Free Exercise Clause bars states from outlawing otherwise legal conduct because it 
is carried due to religious beliefs;164 however, somewhat contrary to this axiom, the 
Court nonetheless upheld the denial of state scholarship funds to a student seeking to 
earn a devotional degree in Witters.165 Moving onto the Free Speech Clause, the 
Court has determined that while states can deny funding for religious topics, they 
cannot discriminate against groups based on religious viewpoint.166 Finally, it has 
said that invalidating the ability of a group to seek heightened protection or 
government benefits constitutes a violation under the Equal Protection Clause.167 
Thus, while the Supreme Court has not formally ruled whether states can exclude 
religious schools from participating in their voucher programs, its jurisprudence 
sheds light on the subject.   
The Supreme Court has said religious schools can participate in state voucher 
programs under the Establishment Clause. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, it upheld a 
Cleveland voucher program providing low-income children in failing schools up to 
$2,250 to attend private schools.168 The vast majority of the children (roughly 96%) 
chose to go to religious schools.169 Opponents used this to argue the voucher program 
gave religious schools a windfall and thereby violated the Establishment Clause.170 
Nonetheless, the Court disregarded its predominant benefit to religious schools 
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because it flowed from true private choice, allowed schools to participate regardless 
of religious status, and created no financial incentives to attend religious schools.171  
Zelman’s reasoning flowed from the seminal Everson decision, where the Court 
endorsed neutrality in dealing with believers and non-believers alike. The case 
centered on whether New Jersey could reimburse parents for their children’s 
transportation costs to and from Catholic schools.172 While challengers alleged this 
violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause,173 the Court flipped this 
reasoning on its head by holding that just as the government could not set up a church 
or prefer a certain religion, it could not influence a person away from religion.174 The 
Court said states could not: “[E]xclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, 
Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the 
members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the 
benefits of public welfare legislation.”175 The holding of the case, then, was that New 
Jersey could use taxpayer money to transport students to Catholic schools.176 
However, Everson’s reasoning rendered discrimination against religion 
unconstitutional as well.   
In Lukumi, the Court determined that laws aimed at suppressing religion violated 
the Free Exercise Clause. The City of Hialeah passed an ordinance “making religious 
animal sacrifice unlawful” in order to prevent practitioners of the Santeria religion 
from conducting their rituals within the city limits.177 While the Court acknowledged 
“a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest”,178 it emphasized that legislature could not “discriminate[] 
against some or all religious beliefs or regulate[] or prohibit[] conduct because it is 
undertaken for religious reasons.”179 Evidence of such discrimination could come 
from the text itself, or the intent behind it. Lukumi presented an example of the latter, 
as the statute was facially neutral but accomplished “an impermissible attempt to 
target petitioners and their religious practices.”180 In other words, it did not 
specifically mention the Santeria religion, but clearly targeted it. The Court 
concluded: “The principle that government…not impose burdens only on conduct 
motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of the rights guaranteed by 
the Free Exercise Clause.”181 Thus, targeting conduct merely because it was religious 
violated the Constitution.  
 However, in Locke v. Davey, the Court said Washington did not violate the Free 
Exercise Clause by refusing to allow a college student to use his state scholarship to 
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earn a devotional degree.182 The case did not rise to the level of Lukumi because 
Washington’s “disfavor of religion” was of a much milder form.183 After all, it did 
not require the student to choose between his religion and a government benefit.184 
He could pursue any other major without abandoning a central requirement of his 
faith.185 The Court’s reasoning turned on the distinct nature of training to enter the 
clergy.186 It noted that America had a long history of dealing differently with 
religious education for the ministry than with education for other callings.187 In fact, 
according to the Court, there were few areas in which the State’s “antiestablishment 
interest [came] more into play.”188 In addition, Washington’s carve-out for religious 
training was narrowly tailored to minimally burden religion. While it barred students 
from using state funds to earn devotional degrees, it still allowed them to attend 
pervasively religious colleges using state funds.189 The Court concluded: “The 
State’s interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial and the 
exclusion of such funding places relatively minor burden on Promise Scholars.”190 
In conclusion, then, unique nature of studying for the clergy combined with the 
minimal burden of refusing to pay for it allowed Washington’s program to pass 
muster.  
Regarding the Free Speech Clause, the Rosenberger Court prohibited states from 
discriminating based on religious viewpoint.191 Rosenberger turned on whether the 
University of Virginia’s could deny funding to “Wide Awake”, a student publication 
dedicated to exploring a variety of topics from a Christian viewpoint. The Court said 
that while the school could refuse to fund certain topics, it could not discriminate 
against articles written from a certain viewpoint.192 In the case at bar, it the problem 
was that “the University does not exclude religion as a subject matter but selects for 
disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial 
viewpoints.”193 In other words, it was denying funds to “Wide Awake” solely 
because it addressed topics from a Christian viewpoint. The Court found it irrelevant 
that the University was withholding its own funds, stating: “[T]he government cannot 
justify viewpoint discrimination…on the economic fact of scarcity.”194 If the state 
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extended funding to student newspapers covering current events, it could not deny 
funding to a group of Muslim or Christian students seeking to do it from the 
perspective of their religion.195 Thus, while religious subject matter could be 
excluded, groups with religious viewpoints could not.   
Finally, in Romer, the Supreme Court invalidated an amendment to the Colorado 
constitution singling out homosexuals as ineligible to receive heightened protections 
against discrimination.196 Colorado claimed the amendment maintained gays and 
lesbians in the same position as everyone else, since it did not strip them of basic 
rights, but prohibited them from receiving heightened protection.197 However, the 
Court found this argument implausible, stating: “The amendment withdraws from 
homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from injuries caused by 
discrimination.”198 In other words, it selected homosexuals as the only group 
constitutionally barred from every receiving heighted protection.199 The Court 
explained: “A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group 
than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal 
protection.”200 While such a law might survive if it advanced a compelling 
government interest,201 the Court said the amendment in question was inexplicable 
by anything other than animus toward gays and lesbians.202 “[I]t is a classification of 
persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not 
permit.”203 Such hostility, in the Court’s view, could never constitute a legitimate 
government interest. Thus, removing homosexuals from the pool eligible to receive 
special protection violated the Equal Protection Clause.  
The Supreme Court, then, has generally advocated a principle of neutrality 
toward religion, but has permitted certain carve-outs for situations like training for 
the clergy.  
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Strongly Suggests Nevada Cannot Exclude 
Religious Schools from its Voucher Program 
 This section will explain why excluding religious schools from Nevada’s ESA 
program violates the Federal Constitution.204 Blaine’s failure to successfully pass his 
amendment in the first place casts some doubt over its congruence with the 
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Constitution as a whole when asserted on a state-level.205  Moreover, Supreme Court 
decisions since then have suggested discriminating against religious schools violates 
several branches of Constitutional jurisprudence.206 The Zelman Court rendered 
voucher programs permissible under the Establishment Clause.207 However, long 
before that, in Everson, the Court held that states should exercise neutrality in dealing 
with religious and non-religious schools alike.208 Zelman and Everson together, then, 
not only permit Nevada’s ESA program, but also prohibit courts from judicially 
amending it to bar parents from sending their children to religious schools. 
Concerning the Free Exercise Clause, Locke permitted a narrow carve-out for clerical 
studies.209 However, Lukumi forbid states from legislating against conduct 
undertaken for religious purposes.210 Excluding schools because they provide 
education with a religious component violates this principle. Next, Rosenberger said 
states could deny funding to groups covering certain topics, but not from holding a 
religious viewpoint.211 Nevada, therefore, cannot discount certain schools because, 
in the words of the ACLU, they “filter their entire curricula through a religious 
worldview.”212 If Nevada makes funding available to schools with a secular 
perspective, it must do the same for schools with a religious perspective. Finally, 
Romer ruled that disqualifying gays from contending for heightened government 
benefits violated the Equal Protection Clause.213 Using Nevada’s no funding clause 
to disqualify religious schools from contending for state voucher money runs afoul 
of this holding. Thus, under a variety of Constitutional clauses, Nevada cannot 
exclude schools from participating in their voucher program on account of religion.   
There is no real question that Nevada’s ESA program is permissible under the 
Federal Constitution. Zelman upheld an Ohio voucher program because it (1) was 
based on “true private choice,” (2) afforded benefits to schools regardless of religious 
affiliation, (3) and did not skew financial incentives in favor of religious schools.214 
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The Nevada voucher program, likewise, centers on the private choice of families, 
who receive the money then decide where to allocate it;215 does not discriminate 
based on religion;216 gives recipients have a plethora of options including private, 
religious, or even homeschooling; and creates no financial incentivizes to attend 
religious schools.217 Thus, Nevada’s ESA program is clearly permissible under the 
Federal Constitution.  
Having established the permissibility of ESAs on the federal level, we will now 
examine why denying access to religious schools violates the neutrality principle 
articulated in Everson. The Everson Court reasoned that states could not “exclude 
individual Catholics, Lutherans…or the members of any other faith, because of their 
faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.”218 
Denying school vouchers on account of a school’s religious affiliation violates this 
principle.219 By arguing that “the voucher program is unconstitutional… because it 
will lead to state funds being given to religiously-affiliated private schools”,220 the 
ACLU contradicts Everson’s prohibition against considering people’s “faith, or lack 
of it” in allocating public benefits.221 Therefore, their interpretation should be 
rejected.222 
Nevada’s ESA program should be distinguished from Locke. There, the Court 
centered its ruling on the unique nature of earning a religious degree to pursue a 
career as a pastor.223 Noting that states had a long history of refusing to support 
clergymen,224 the Court reasoned: “The State's interest in not funding the pursuit of 
devotional degrees is substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively 
minor burden on Promise Scholars...”225 This reasoning, however, does not extend to 
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religious schools under Nevada’s no funding clause. First, opponents of Nevada’s 
school choice program interpret its no funding clause to prohibit funding nearly any 
religious school.226 Denying funds to every K-12 religious school is far broader in 
scope than refusing to fund college degrees in pastoral ministry for future pastors.227 
Second, states do not have a long history of denying funds to religious causes, 
especially private religious schools.228 This clearly cuts against Locke’s bedrock 
argument that states had traditionally refused to fund pastors.229 Lastly, the Locke 
Court noted with approval that, besides its narrow carve-out for pastoral studies, 
Washington still permitted students to attend “pervasively religious colleges” using 
state funds.230 By contrast, invalidating the voucher program at issue here would 
permit no such compromise; it would ban the application of state money toward any 
school the court deemed sectarian. Thus, it should be distinguished from the narrow 
facts in Locke.  
 Instead, ESAs should be upheld under the reasoning in Lukumi. One must 
concede that disqualifying religious schools from participating in a voucher program 
does parallel criminalizing religious practices. However, Lukumi said the “legislature 
could not “discriminate[] against some or all religious beliefs or regulate[] or 
prohibit[] conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.”231 Religious 
schools presumably inculcate religious subject into their K-12 educations because of 
their religious convictions.232 Proceeding from this premise, interpreting Nevada’s 
no funding clause to exclude them from receiving ESA money violates the same 
principle Hialeah did by criminalizing animal sacrifices motivated by Santeria. 
Moreover, the Lukumi Court said evidence of discrimination could come either from 
the text of a bill itself or the intent behind it.233 The Nevada Supreme Court candidly 
admitted that a Catholic orphan asylum “…greatly, if not entirely, impelled the 
adoption of [its “baby Blaine”] amendment.”234 This provides prima facie evidence 
of discriminatory intent.235 Thus, claiming religious schools cannot receive voucher 
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money on account of their faith violates Lukumi’s admonition against “impos[ing] 
burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief...”236 Consequently, such an 
interpretation should be rejected.  
Under the Free Speech Clause, interpreting Nevada’s no funding clause to bar 
religious schools from its ESA program constitutes viewpoint discrimination under 
Rosenberger. The ACLU said “the private religious schools [at issue]” should be 
disqualified from participating in Nevada’s ESA program because they “filter their 
entire curricula through a religious worldview.”237 Yet, Rosenberger prohibited 
this.238 There, the Court took issue with the fact that: “[T]he University does not 
exclude religion as a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those student 
journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints.”239 While the University could 
deny funding to student groups writing about subject matter like the Bible, it could 
not deny funding because they approached subject matter from a Biblical worldview. 
240 Likewise, Nevada’s ESA program could theoretically exclude paying for Bible 
study or Catholic catechism without violating the U.S. Constitution;241 however, it 
cannot deny funding to schools educating students from a religious viewpoint. 
Moreover, as the Rosenberger Court said,  “the government cannot justify viewpoint 
discrimination…on the economic fact of scarcity.”242 Rosenberger’s prohibition, 
then, clearly applies to affirmative funding like the voucher program at issue. 
Consequently, disqualifying schools from state funding because they filter their 
curricula through a religious worldview violates the Free Speech Clause. 
Finally, rendering religious schools constitutionally eligible to compete for ESA 
funding would violate the Equal Protection Clause under Romer. 243  There, the Court 
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invalidated an amendment to the Colorado constitution barring gay people from 
receiving special legal protections. It explained: “A law declaring that in general it 
shall be more difficult for one group than for all others to seek aid from the 
government is itself a denial of equal protection.”244 Yet the ACLU’s interpretation 
of Nevada’s no funding clause similarly singles out religious schools as the only 
group ineligible to receive voucher money.245 The ACLU might respond that Nevada 
has a compelling interest in retaining “…the walls separating church and state erected 
in Nevada’s constitution.”246 However, the Romer court said a law targeting gays was 
inherently motivated by animus.247   The same seems to hold true for denying funds 
to religions schools. This argument is further compounded by the historical role of 
baby Blaine Amendments as targeting Catholicism.248  As discussed earlier, the 
amendment in question was pushed largely as a means of defunding a Catholic 
orphan asylum. Thus, interpreting Nevada’s no funding clause to single out religious 
schools as the only group unable to compete for voucher money would violate the 
Equal Protection Clause under Romer.  
Interpreting Nevada’s no funding clause to exclude religious schools from 
participating in its ESA program violates various Constitutional clauses. First, under 
the Establishment Clause, Zelman approved voucher programs like the one at issue; 
meanwhile, Everson proposed a principle of neutrality regarding religious and non-
religious schools alike. Excluding religious schools from Nevada’s ESA program not 
neutral. While Locke interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to permit a narrow carve 
out for states to refuse funding the clergy, Lukumi invalidated state laws targeting 
conduct undertaken for religious reasons. A religious K-12 education clearly flows 
from religious conviction and is hardly analogous to training for the clergy. Under 
the Free Speech Clause, Rosenberger said states could not discriminate based on 
religious viewpoint. Therefore, the ACLU’s allegation that religious schools should 
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be excluded because they filter curricula through a Christian worldview should be 
rejected. Finally, Romer said Colorado’s constitutional amendment removing gays 
from among those eligible to receive heightened protection constituted a denial of 
equal protection and could be motivated by nothing other than animus. Likewise, 
rendering religious schools the only group ineligible for voucher money hardly 
reflects a benevolent view of them. Hostility becomes even harder to deny in light of 
the Nevada Supreme Court’s admission that its no funding clause was enacted to 
defund a Catholic orphan asylum creates clear proof of hostile motivations. Nevada 
courts, therefore, should not interpret its no funding clause to exclude religious 
schools.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Nevada case law and precedent from other states suggest its ESA program is 
constitutionally permissible. Beginning with its “baby Blaine” amendment, Nevada 
should recognize vouchers as funding families, not religious schools. As states like 
Arizona and Indiana have said, this severs the connection between legislature and 
religious schools. While Washington barred even independent applications of state 
money, the case at issue involved a student seeking a devotional degree to join the 
clergy. Nevada’s ESA program promotes a general K-12 education, thereby 
distinguishing it. Moreover, even if Nevada adopted Washington’s reasoning, many 
religious schools would remain eligible for ESA funding under Nevada’s own case 
law. The Hallock Court interpreted “sectarian” to include Catholics, Presbyterians, 
and others, but not general Protestantism. Consequently, rendering ESAs a form of 
direct aid to religious schools would merely devolve the situation into the unwieldy 
task of determining, by judicial fiat, whether a given religious school qualified as 
sectarian or not. Fortunately, that Pandora’s box need not be opened. Nevada courts 
can elect an outcome that is both principled and practical by recognizing that its ESA 
program puts money into an account for individual families to use as the please.  
Transitioning to Nevada’s uniformity clause, Nevada case law and precedent 
from other states once again support upholding its ESA program. The Hallock court 
said orphans could not augment district funding because they were legally barred 
from attending public schools. By contrast, all ESA recipients are free to attend public 
schools. Moreover, ESA funding is subtracted from the public school fund according 
to the number of ESA recipients who elect to leave them. While one can quibble 
about the desirability of such a program, it does not provide a windfall for any party. 
Looking to other states, Florida relied on its “paramount duty” clause to justify 
restricting funding to public schools. Nevada lacks analogous language. Indiana and 
Wisconsin, meanwhile, used the absence of such language to interpret their 
uniformity clauses as a floor permitting other educational options. Thus, under the 
current uniformity clause landscape, it would be natural for Nevada to adopt the later 
approach given the similarity of its constitutional language.  
ENN’s two procedural objections deserve little discussion given their minimal 
merit. The Nevada legislature is constitutionally entrusted to fund public schools. By 
directing ESA money to be allocated from the Education Fund according to the 
number of students who utilize them, the legislature has thereby deemed the 
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remaining amount sufficient for public schools. It would be illogical to hold the 
Nevada legislature renders its own allocation insufficient by directing part of to the 
ESA program. Second, it is simply false to claim Nevada Education Fund is 
constitutionally restricted to public schools. As already discussed, the clause in 
question says money from the Education Fund must be used for educational 
purposes; it never mentions public schools. Education Savings Accounts permit 
various means of education – private schooling, homeschooling and the like – but fall 
within its purview. Thus, ENN’s claims should be rejected.  
Finally, this year the Supreme Court will deliver an affirmative ruling on whether 
states can deny funding to religious organizations solely on the basis of religion. 
While the question has thus far gone without a formal answer, Supreme Court 
jurisprudence prohibits the exclusion of religious organizations from otherwise 
available programs solely on the basis of creed. Under the Establishment Clause, 
Everson demanded neutrality toward religious and non-religious schools alike in 
allocating government benefits. Predicating participation on whether a school is 
“sectarian” violates this principle. Moving to the Free Exercise Clause, Locke 
permitted Washington to prohibit a scholarship recipient from using it to earn a 
devotional degree in preparation for the clergy. While this cuts against other cases 
discussed in the Note, the Court based its reasoning largely on the unique nature of 
training to become a pastor and the fact that states had historically refused to fund it. 
Nevada’s situation is distinguishable since private religious schools do not prepare 
children for the ministry or have a history of being denied state funding. Thus, Locke 
is inapplicable. Lukumi, meanwhile, prohibited the government from targeting 
conduct undertaken for religious reasons. Since religious schools incorporate their 
respective faiths for religious reasons, targeting them for disfavored treatment on that 
basis is impermissible. One might object that while Lukumi dealt with criminal 
sanctions, Nevada’s voucher program bestows a positive benefit. However, that 
objection smoothly transitions us to Rosenberger. There, the Court said states could 
not discriminate against groups based on their religious viewpoint. Moreover, it 
expressly said this applied to government funding. Nevada, then, cannot exclude 
religious schools from voucher money because they teach from a religious 
perspective. Lastly, Romer prohibited the practice of stripping certain groups of their 
eligibility to seek heightened government benefits. One might argue the government 
can overcome this through its compelling interest in maintaining the wall of 
separation between church and state, but Everson’s neutrality principle once again 
cuts against that theory. Therefore, Supreme Court jurisprudence not only permits 
voucher programs; it invalidates state discrimination against religious schools.  
Throughout our analysis of Supreme Court jurisprudence, a striking theme 
appears: that targeting specific groups for disfavored treatment based on religious 
creed, sexual orientation, or other such characteristics is impermissible. And while 
individual states can extend their protections and prohibitions beyond the Federal 
Constitution, the Supremacy Clause prevents attempts to undermine it. Interpreting 
Nevada’s “baby Blaine” amendment to bar religious schools violates our 
Constitution. Consequently, Nevada courts should reject any argument reaching that 
outcome.  
 
